Dealing with uncertainty adds a further level of complexity to problems of reliability analysis. The uncertainties which impact reliability studies usually involve incomplete or imprecise reliability data and complex failure dependencies. This paper proposes an original methodology based on the transferable belief model (TBM) to include failure dependencies between components in the evaluation of the reliability of the whole system, given both epistemic and aleatory uncertainties. First, based on expert opinion and experimental data, basic probability assignments (BPAs) are assigned to reliability data components. TBM operations are then used to obtain the reliability of the whole system, for series, parallel, series-parallel, parallel-series, and bridge configurations. Implicit, explicit, and discounting approaches are presented for taking account of failure dependencies. Finally, the proposed model is applied to take into account common cause failures (CCFs) in a case study.
INTRODUCTION
Uncertainties are one of the most challenging problems in reliability studies of complex systems [1] [2] [3] . They are present in any reliability evaluation, owing to randomness in failure phenomena and the difficulty of obtaining failure data for components that fail only infrequently. Uncertainties have been classified into two subtypes: aleatory uncertainty and epistemic uncertainty. Aleatory uncertainty is also called irreducible, or inherent uncertainty. It is the inherent variation associated with the physical system or the environment under consideration [4] . Aleatory uncertainty includes, for example, the inherent variability of failures and repair times of equipment. Epistemic uncertainty is subjective and reducible because it arises from a lack of knowledge or data. It represents *Corresponding author: Compiegne University of Technology, Heudiasyc BP 20529, 60205 Compiegne, France. email: mohamed.sallak@utc.fr the uncertainty of the outcome owing to lack of knowledge or information in any phase or activity of the modelling process [4] . This uncertainty is associated with incompleteness in the analysts' state of knowledge and has an impact on the evaluation of system reliability. It is therefore important to take proper account of aleatory and epistemic uncertainties in any analysis of reliability.
In safety and reliability studies, the system's reliability at any time is evaluated using the probabilities of components failing at the same time. These failure probabilities are estimated using laboratory and generic reliability data provided by reliability databases [5] . However, using data from the laboratory and from generic data sources involves epistemic uncertainty. As mentioned by Kletz [6] , because of operating conditions and environments, when using generic reliability data the reliability parameters for the components used can deviate by a factor of 3 or 4, and a factor of 10 is not unusual. Furthermore, according to Drouin et al. [7] , uncertainties in probabilistic risk assessment are mainly epistemic.
In the presence of epistemic uncertainty, classical probability theories are based on the representation of failure probabilities of components at time t by probability density functions (PDFs) . The PDF f i (x) at time t indicates the probability that the value of the failure probability for a component i at time t falls between x and x + dx. Classical probability theories based on Monte Carlo simulations (MCS) can then be used to evaluate the reliability of the whole system. The Dempster-Shafer (D-S) theory, which is a generalization of classical probability theory, can also be used to evaluate the reliability of the whole system, using Strat's technique [8] , which allows belief mass functions to be derived from individual PDFs.
However, in some cases, there is not sufficient information about components' reliability data to derive PDFs. This is particularly frequent when systems have only rare component failures (nuclear systems, chemical processes, railway systems, etc.) or have not been operating long enough to provide valid statistical data. As an alternative to generic reliability data, expert knowledge/judgement is used [9] . In this work, the reliability parameters of components are based on expert judgement.
When using a classical probabilistic approach based on MCS with expert judgement, reliability researchers generally assume a log-normal or log-triangular distribution for the PDF for conventional reasons. This arbitrary choice of PDF can make the resulting reliability evaluation imprecise or even erroneous. The D-S theory does not need to assume a PDF for component failure. It allows a flexible representation of uncertainty for data sources of different types, and expert judgement in particular. Moreover, multiple expert knowledge can provide more reliable information for an observation (e.g. the failure probability of a component) than a single expert can. The expert judgement can often suffer from incompleteness and conflict. D-S theory addresses these issues effectively and is able to combine multi-expert knowledge by taking into account ignorance and conflicts through a belief structure. The D-S representation is proposed in this paper as an attractive way of dealing with the issue at hand (expert judgement), without the use of unjustified assumptions concerning the PDF distribution. The D-S theory has several interpretations, such as the transferable belief model (TBM). In this work the TBM is proposed for using expert judgement in order to evaluate the reliability of the whole system.
In many reliability studies, failures of system components are assumed to be independent. However, in reality, different types of dependencies can be involved, rendering the results of reliability evaluations false. Fricks and Trivedi [10] have proposed a classification of failure dependencies (common cause failures (CCFs), standby dependencies, etc.). There are two principal methods to model failure dependencies in system reliability analysis: implicit and explicit methods [11] . The implicit method is where joint probabilities, correlation values, or conditional probabilities [12] are used. In explicit methods, the causes of dependencies are explicitly included in the system's logic model [12] as a block in reliability block diagrams (RBDs) or a basic event in fault trees (FTs). Here it is proposed that the two approaches are used, together with an additional discounting approach, for reliability analysis using the TBM model.
RELATED WORK
The first work introducing D-S theory in reliability analysis was presented by Dempster and Kong [13] . They proposed the use of an FT as a particular case of the tree of cliques to propagate beliefs through the tree. The prior beliefs of basic events of the tree represent prior failure beliefs of components. The second work was presented by Guth in 1991 [14] and concerned FT analysis. Guth represented the belief that a basic event A happens with failure probability p by three-valued logic (true, false, and unknown) and proposed truth tables with the three-valued logic in order to propagate the beliefs in FT. Chin and Ramchandran [15] proposed using evidence theory to capture the non-specificity and conflict features in judgements. The beliefs are then propagated in an FT in order to diagnose the fault distribution of web service process. Walley [16] and Kozine and Filimonov [17] showed that in some applications the use of Dempster's combination rule led to incorrect results. Almond [18] developed graphical models using belief functions and applied this graphical model in FT analysis. Rakowsky and Gocht [19] have modelled uncertainties in reliability-centred maintenance (RCM). They use belief and plausibility measures to express the uncertainties of experts in reasoning. They also use weighted recommendations during the RCM process. This approach was applied to a fire detection and extinguishing system. Pashazadeh and Sharifi [20] proposed reliability assessment under epistemic uncertainty using D-S and vague set theories. They eliminated the gap between the representation of combined evidence and the representation of component reliability in the vague set theory. Shafer et al. [21] have proposed combining Bayesian networks and D-S theory to study the reliability of systems given imprecise reliability data. They use evidential networks and junction tree inference algorithms.
There is very little work covering the use of TBM theory to model failure dependencies in reliability studies. Almond [18] proposed addressing the problem of dependency between basic events by using pivotal variables and information dependence breaking theorem. Walley [16] proposed an example which indicated that D-S theory is not well suited to handle dependency in the case of total ignorance of dependencies. An original TBM reliability analysis is therefore proposed in order to take into account failure dependencies in reliability evaluations.
BASIC NOTIONS OF THE TRANSFERABLE BELIEF MODEL (TBM)
The TBM was introduced by Smets and Kennes [22] as a subjectivist interpretation of D-S theory. The D-S theory, also called evidence theory, was first described by Dempster in the 1960s [23] with the study of upper and lower probabilities and extended by Shafer in 1976 [24] . The TBM is a framework well suited for representing and manipulating aleatory and epistemic uncertainties. It is based on two levels: the credal level, where available pieces of information are represented by belief functions, and the pignistic or decision level, where belief functions are transformed into probability measures. It was originally applied in information fusion [25, 26] , pattern recognition [27, 28] , and diagnosis [29] . In a finite discrete space, the TBM can be interpreted as a generalization of probability theory where probabilities can be assigned to any subsets instead of singletons only. In this section, basic notions, extended operations, and the terminology of TBM are explained. For a more detailed presentation see references [22] to [24] .
Frame of discernment
The frame of discernment X is the definition domain of the variable of interest x. It consists of all mutually exclusive elementary propositions. It can be viewed as the sample space in probability theory. As an example, let us consider a frame of discernment X = {x 1 , x 2 }.
Then, x 1 and x 2 are elementary propositions and mutually exclusive of each other. The power set 2 X is the set of all the subsets of X including itself, i.e. 2 X = {∅, {x 1 }, {x 2 }, X }.
Basic probability assignment (BPA)
Probability theory is based on the definition of a probability space (X , M , P), where X is the frame of discernment, P the probability function defined on a collection M of subsets (events) A i of X that satisfies the properties of a σ -algebra, i.e. M is closed under complementation and countable unions, and it follows easily that it is also closed under countable intersections. The probability function P, a function mapping the collection of events M into [0, 1], is required to respect P(X ) = 1 and P(∅) = 0 and to be sub-additive, i.e. P(A ∪ B) P(A) + P(B), and this inequality holds for any countable collection of disjoint events.
These properties are essential for understanding the differences with D-S theory. A basic probability assignment (BPA) on X , also called a basic belief assignment (BBA), is a function, m X : 2 X → [0, 1], which maps probability masses onto subsets of events, and not only onto events, such that
The impact of a piece of evidence on an agent is translated by an allocation of parts of an initial unitary amount of belief among the subsets of frame of discernment. The number m X (A) represents the part of the agent's belief that supports A [22] . A clear distinction has to be made between probabilities and basic belief assignment: probability distribution functions are defined on X and BPAs on the power set 2 X . The number of possible hypotheses is then 2 card(X ) in D-S theory, while in probability theory it is card(X ). Moreover, D-S theory ignores the sub-additivity hypothesis required for probability functions in probability theory. The subsets A ⊂ X such that m X (A) > 0 are called focal sets of m X . A BPA having a singleton {x} (x ∈ X ) as a unique focal set represents complete knowledge.
A BPA having only singletons as focal sets is equivalent to probabilities. A BPA having X as a unique focal set represents complete ignorance and is called vacuous. D-S includes an additional dimension of uncertainty when compared to a probabilistic model. BPAs can be assigned to subsets of events without distributing these BPAs further on events. For example, in the case of lack of knowledge, the expert is not obliged to assume a specific BPA for the occurrence of an event. This is why we say that the BPA is an incompletely defined probability space. Moreover, D-S theory is a generalization of the Bayesian theory of subjective probability. Whereas the Bayesian theory requires probabilities for each question of interest, BPAs allow degrees of belief for one question to be based on probabilities for a related question. This means that in reliability engineering, with D-S theory, it is possible to take into account the reliability of experts, who give the BPAs for components failure, in the evaluation of the reliability of the whole system. In addition, BPA has further properties, which distinguish it from being a probability function: refer to Klir and Folger [30] :
(c) there is no relationship between m(A) and m(Ā); (d) also m(A) + m(Ā) does not always have to be 1.
Belief and plausibility functions
The belief Bel and plausibility Pl functions for a subset A are defined as follows
Bel(A) measures the total assignment of belief to A and all its subsets. The plausibility function measures the extent to which we fail to disbelieve the hypothesis of A. [Bel(A), Pl(A)] can be viewed as the confidence interval which describes the uncertainty of A. The functions Bel and Pl, although they too are functions mapping events A onto [0, 1], and mapping ∅ onto 0 and into 1, do not fulfil in the general case the subadditivity properties given for probability.
Combination rules
Consider two distinct pieces of evidence m X i and m X j from two different sources i and j. In TBM, the principal combination rules are the conjunctive and disjunctive combination rules [24] . The conjunctive combination is given by
The disjunctive combination is given by
Dempster's rule of combination is defined as the conjunctive combination of two normal BPAs followed by normalization. This rule is also called the orthogonal sum of evidence. It is defined as
The number defined by k = A∩B=∅,∀A,B⊆X m X i (A) m X j (B) is called the conflict factor between the two pieces of evidence i and j.
As some reliability researchers [16, 17] have pointed out, Dempster's rule sometimes generates incorrect conclusions in the case of serious conflict between evidence. In this case, it is recommended to investigate the given information or to collect more information. Several combination rules have been defined and they often differ in the way the evidence mass of an empty intersection is allocated [31, 32] .
Discounting
It sometimes occurs that a source of information induces a BPA m X , but there is some doubt regarding the reliability of this source. Such metaknowledge may be represented by discounting [24] m X by some factor δ ∈ [0, 1], which leads to a BPA m X δ defined as
A discount rate δ = 1 means that the source can certainly not be trusted: the resulting BPA is then vacuous. In contrast, a null discount rate leaves m X unchanged: this corresponds to the situation where the source is known to be fully reliable.
Coarsening and refinement
The first step in TBM is to define the frame of discernment. As noted by Shafer [24] , the degree of granularity of the frame is always, to some extent, a matter of convention, since any element representing a state can always be split into several possibilities. Hence, it is fundamental to examine how a belief function defined on a frame may be expressed in a finer or, conversely, in a coarser frame [24, 33] .
Consider two finite sets X and Y . A mapping ρ :
Y is called a coarsening of X , and X is called a refinement of Y .
A BPA m Y on Y can be transformed into a BPA m X on a refinement X by transferring each mass
Operations on joint spaces
Consider a BPA m X ×Y defined on the Cartesian prod-
where
The inverse operation is a particular instance of vacuous extension. Consider a BPA m X defined on X . Its vacuous extension on X × Y is defined by
Let m XY denote a BPA on X × Y (with underlying variables (x, y)), and m XY y the BPA on X ×Y with single focal set X × {y}. The conditional BPA of x given y = y is defined as
The conditioning operation for belief functions has the same meaning as in probability theory. However, it also admits an inverse operation called the ballooning extension. Let m X [y] denote the conditional BPAs on X , given y. The ballooning extension of m X [y] on X × Y is the least committed BPA whose conditioning on y yields m X [y]. It is obtained as
In order to optimize the TBM operations and save time and space, some computation algorithms were given in references [18] and [34] .
THE PROPOSED TBM RELIABILITY ANALYSIS
In this paper, both system and components have only two possible states: either working (W ) or failed (F ) (i.e. the so-called binary state assumption is made). Using BPAs of functioning and failed system components, the goal is to obtain the reliability of the whole system in the case of series, parallel [35] , seriesparallel, parallel-series, and bridge configurations. A preliminary work concerning series and parallel systems was presented in reference [35] .
Frame of discernment
In virtue of the binary state assumption, the frame of discernment X i of a component i is given by X i = {F i , W i }. F i and W i represent respectively the failure and the working states of the component i. The study is started by considering a simple system S composed of two components 1 and 2. The frames of discernment of components 1, 2, and S are then:
BPAs, belief and plausibility functions of system components
BPA structure is a more natural and intuitive way to express one's degree of belief in a hypothesis where only partial evidence is available. In reliability studies, based on expert opinion and experimental data, BPAs of components are computed directly and this computation requires some efforts from a reliability expert. The BPAs assigned to system components by expert opinion and experimental data can be then expressed by
Using equation (2), the belief and plausibility functions of components 1 and 2 are computed. For example, if component 1 is considered, then:
Assignment of BPAs for component failure
The BPAs for the different component reliability parameters are acquired from different sources. In safety and reliability engineering, data are usually taken from generic data or based on expert judgement [36] . In the present study, BPAs are directly obtained from experts because there are not enough reliability data from reliability databases covering the components used in the system under consideration. The TBM postulates that the impact of a piece of evidence on an expert is translated by an allocation of parts of an initial unitary amount of belief among the propositions (the subsets) of
is a part of the expert's belief that supports Y . For example, an expert 1 may report having a 0.7 part of belief supporting the proposition 'component A is working at time t'. The same expert reports having a 0.1 part of belief supporting the proposition 'component A is not working at time t'. Mathematically, this can be written as m
represents the epistemic uncertainty of the expert concerning the functioning of component A at time t owing to lack of information.
The problem is now how to combine two or more BPAs from different experts regarding the same component A. Several combination rules were defined in D-S theory. In this work, the independence of different experts' opinions is assumed. This is why Dempster's rule of combination is used. Now, let us assume that another expert 2 reports as follows in relation to the same component A: m
These two independent assessments for the same component can be combined using the D-S combination rule. The conflict factor is then k = 0.1850. The BPAs obtained are m
Dempster's rule satisfies the properties of associativity, commutativity, and non-idempotence. However, two major limitations of this rule are its lack of robustness in the presence of highly conflicting information (k → 1), and the requirement that the sources of information must be independent. The problem of conflict has been addressed by several authors, who have proposed rules which are generally not associative [33] . The other important limitation of Dempster's rule lies in the assumption that the BPAs must be distinct, i.e. the experts' opinions must be independent. The idea is that in combination operations no elementary BPAs should be counted twice. This problem was addressed by Ling and Rudd [37] , who proposed a rule limited to the combination of belief functions having at most two focal sets including the frame of discernment. Elouedi and Mellouli [38] extended this method to belief functions that can be decomposed as the conjunctive sum of simple belief functions. Denoeux [39] proposed a commutative, associative, and idempotent cautious rule for belief functions which are not separable. This cautious rule generalizes a method proposed by Kennes [40] for combining separable BPAs induced by non-distinct items of evidence, based on an application of category theory to evidential reasoning. These rules provide reliability analysis with an appropriate means of taking account of non-independent expert judgements. In this work, the absence of significant conflicts between experts' opinions is assumed, as well as their independence.
Evaluation of BPAs, beliefs and plausibility functions of the whole system S
First, vacuous extension is used to extend m X 1 and m X 2 to the product space X 1 × X 2 × X S . The resulting BPAs are combined using Dempster's rule. Then, the resulting BPAs are combined with m X 1 ×X 2 ×X S Config which represents the system configuration.
The BPA m X 1 ×X 2 ×X S Config represents the relation between the system S and its components 1 and 2. It is given by
for a series configuration.
And
for a parallel configuration.
To obtain BPAs of system S, the final result is marginalized on X S . Belief and plausibility functions are then computed from m X S . Formally, the final BPA is defined as follows
The system's reliability R S is then given by R S ∈ [Bel({W S }), Pl({W S })].
Parallel configuration. The results of BPAs related
to parallel configuration can be generalized to n (1 i n) components with BPAs f i , w i , and 1 − f i − w i (cf. 
Numerical application: two cases

Case I: Aleatory uncertainty
Consider four systems (cf. Fig. 1 ): a simple series system with two components A and B, a simple parallel system with two components A and B, a parallelseries system with six components A, B, C, D, E, and F , and a bridge system with five components A, B, C, D, and E. Let us consider only aleatory uncertainty for components A, B, C, D, E, and F , as shown in Table 2 (there is no epistemic uncertainty about components, i.e. m X i ({F i , W i }) = 0). In order to compare this approach with a classical probabilistic approach, BPAs are used in the TBM approach, and crisp failure probabilities of components P i in the conventional probabilistic approach (cf. Table 2 ). In this case, it is 
Fig. 1
RBDs of systems: S1, S2, S3, and S4 
The system reliabilities for S1, S2, S3, and S4 are then computed using the TBM model and the probabilistic approach based on minimal cut-sets [41] . As expected, the same results are obtained for the reliabilities of all four systems with the two approaches (cf. Table 3 ).
Case II: Aleatory and epistemic uncertainty
Epistemic uncertainty for components A, B, D, and F is now considered, as shown in Table 4 . The present probabilistic method of determining the system's reliabilities involves representing the epistemic . The PDF f i (x) at time t indicates the probability that the value of the failure probability of a component i at time t falls between x and x + dx. In order to compare the results with those obtained by a classical probabilistic approach, the epistemic uncertainty will be represented by a log-normal PDF which is defined by a median m and an error factor (EF) obtained from the BPAs as follows
In this probabilistic approach, the @FAULT TREE + software package developed by ISOGRAPH is used to generate minimal cut-sets and system reliabilities. It uses Monte-Carlo sampling simulations to sample repeatedly component failure probabilities from the appropriate distributions, and to calculate and record the system's reliabilities. The confidence interval of the probabilistic approach is 99 per cent. Table 5 presents the results computed by the TBM and by probabilistic approaches. Table 6 also gives analytical expressions for parallel system S1 of focal sets and corresponding BPAs before marginalization on X S . It shows that the differences between results obtained using these two different approaches are very small. However, the width of the support defined by the probabilistic approach is higher than the width of the support in the TBM approach. By assuming a log-normal PDF for system and component failures, more uncertainty is introduced into the probabilistic approach.
MODELLING FAILURE DEPENDENCIES IN TBM RELIABILITY ANALYSIS
Introduction
Nowadays, complex systems use redundant components in order to increase the overall system reliability. However, redundant systems are usually subject to multiple failure dependencies [42] . CCFs were the most frequently studied failure dependency models. Reliability researchers have usually integrated CCFs in the system reliability model (FT [11] , RBD [43] , stochastic Petri nets [10] , etc.). Other failure dependencies were integrated implicitly by increasing the failure rates of components [12] . The use of BPAs is proposed to represent failure dependencies, and extended operations defined in TBM reliability analysis to obtain the whole system's reliability. Implicit, explicit, and discounting approaches will be presented. Numerical results show the differences between the three approaches.
The implicit approach
Let us consider a simple system S composed of two components 1 and 2 in parallel. BPAs of components 1 and 2 are given in equation (15) . Suppose that reliability experts performing functional system tests have observed that the failure of component 2 leads to the failure of component 1 in γ 1 cases. The factor γ 1 is called the dependency factor. Let us also suppose that these experts have indicated the BPAs of components 1 and 2 (cf. equation (15) ). The goal is to evaluate the system reliability R S given this information.
The proposed implicit approach is to code the dependency between components 1 and 2 by the conditional BPAs
The ballooning extension is used to decondition the BPAs in equation (16) and equation (17) to X 1 × X 2 . The BPAs obtained are then vacuous extended to X 1 × X 2 × X S and combined using Dempster's rule with the BPAs of the simple parallel configuration and the BPAs of components 1 and 2 extended to X 1 × X 2 × X S . The final results after marginalization on X S are given in Table 7 . The factor γ 1 can be viewed as a correlation factor which assigns an additional BPA to the failure of component 1, given the failure of component 2. Note that this conditional BPA (cf. equation (16)) introduces a conflict factor k 1 = γ 1 f 2 w 1 . Table 6 BPAs results of simple parallel system without dependencies Table 7 Implicit, explicit, and discounting approaches: BPAs of system S (k 1 = γ 1 f 2 w 1 and
Implicit approach
Discounting approach f 1 f 2 1
The explicit approach
The parallel system S referred to above is now considered again. Let M be a virtual component with two states, E and I . The E state indicates the presence of CCFs. In this case, the components 1 and 2 are both failed (F 1 , F 2 ) or both working (W 1 , W 2 ). The I state indicates the absence of CCFs. In this case, all states are possible for components 1 and 2. These two assumptions are coded by the conditional BPAs
The frame of discernment of M is then given by X M = {E, I } and the BPAs related to M are given by
The BPAs of equation (18) and equation (19) are deconditioned to X 1 × X 2 . The BPAs obtained and the BPAs of equation (20) are extended to X 1 × X 2 × X S × X M . The obtained BPAs are then combined with the BPAs of the parallel structure. The final results after marginalization on X S are given in Table 7 .
The factor δ 1 can be viewed as a correlation factor which assigns an additional BPA to the fact that components 1 and 2 are either both working or failed, knowing the state E of virtual component M . The factor δ 2 assigns a mass value to the fact that the components 1 and 2 may have all possible states. Since the BPA is vacuous, given the state I of component M , δ 2 does not appear in the final results. Note that in this case, the BPA of equation (18) also introduces a conflict factor k 2 = δ 1 (f 1 w 2 + f 2 w 1 )).
The discounting approach
We now return again to the system S referred to above. The BPAs of components 1 and 2 are given in equation (20) . There are several discounting approaches [24] in literature. Our discounting operation involves weakening, in the BPAs of Table 6 (21), (22) , and (23)). The corresponding BPAs in Table 6 are then modified accordingly. Final results after marginalization on X S are given in Table 7 . Fig. 2 Implicit, explicit and discounting approaches: reliability of system S as a function of dependency factors γ 1 , δ 1 , and µ 1
Comparison between approaches
To illustrate the three approaches, the BPAs of components A and B defined in Table 4 (case II) are used. The BPAs and reliability of system S are then computed as a function of dependency factors γ 1 , δ 1 , and µ 1 (cf. Fig. 2 ). In the three cases, as would be expected, the reliability of system S decreases as factors γ 1 , δ 1 , and µ 1 increase. The explicit approach models CCFs, because the virtual component M allows any condition or event to be modelled that affects several components, inducing their simultaneous failure. In the case of several CCFs, the number of components is higher than in the implicit approach (each type i of CCFs will be modelled by a virtual component M i ). Furthermore, the discounting approach means that the BPAs of components can be revised during system operation. For example, if in a functioning system, uncertainty concerning a given component's state is increased as a result of some external event, a discounting operation can be performed on the associated BPAs by m * (
CASE STUDY
The complexity within a railway system lies not in any particular technical aspect, although these are complicated, but in the interactions and relationships between the different components. Particularly, there are a number of subsystems which present complicated dependencies.
Let us consider a system composed of a computer with three power supplies and two operated subsystems for self-diagnosis of failures [44] . The first subsystem (cf. Fig. 3 ) is composed of two redundant global memories (GM 1 and GM 2 ) in series with 2 out of 3 control processors (CP 1 , CP 2 , and CP 3 ). The second operated subsystem is composed of one global memory (GM 1 ) in series with 1 out of 3 (CP 1 , CP 2 , and CP 3 ) control processors. This kind of system is often used for a safety-critical signalling system such as automatic train stop. It is supposed that only if both subsystems fail, then the total system fails dangerously. Subsystems have two failure modes: the first due to the use of subsystems and the second due to the failure of power supplies. The power supplies configuration is not static, it is a function of the solicitation of the operated subsystems, and may have a 1 out of 3 or a 2 out of 3 configuration. That's why it is too difficult to model the power supplies in the RBD of the whole system. The study is only concerned with CCFs induced by power supplies. Since the two subsystems share a common power supply, a failure of power supplies may occur which induces the common mode failures of both subsystems. Reliability experts give BPAs of failure components (cf. Table 8 ). The First, the typed state influence diagram (TSID) of the system (cf. Fig. 3 ) is presented in order to identify the whole system states as a function of the components states. The BPAs of subsystems A and B are computed, and it is assumed that m(CCFs) = χ (0 χ 1). The three approaches defined above are used to evaluate the system's reliability as a function of the presence of CCFs considering that χ = γ 1 = δ 1 = µ 1 and δ 2 = 1 − δ 1 . This means that in the case study there is no epistemic uncertainty regarding the presence of CCFs. The epistemic uncertainty concerns only the system components' failure data. The probabilistic approach is based on the use of log-normal PDFs (see section 3.6) and the beta model [12] defined in @FAULT TREE+which assumes to add a proportion β owing to CCFs to the failures probabilities of components, i.e. for each component i, P T (i) = P I (i)+P CCF (i) and P CCF (i) = β.P I (i) where P T (i), P I (i), and P CCF (i) are respectively the total failure probability, the independent failure probability, and the failure probability owing to CCFs of component i. In this case, the factor β is equal to χ . Results show that CCFs tend to decrease significantly the overall system reliability in all the cases (cf. Table 9 ). Compared with explicit and implicit approaches, discounting and probabilistic approaches introduce more uncertainty regarding system reliability. Note that the fairly low values of the conflict factors provide an a posteriori justification of the use of Dempster's rule in this work.
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
The TBM theory has recently attracted the attention of the reliability engineering community. This paper presents an original approach for taking account of failure dependencies in reliability evaluations, given both epistemic and aleatory uncertainties. First, the proposed TBM reliability model was applied to evaluate the reliability of series, parallel, series-parallel, parallel-series, and bridge systems in the presence of both epistemic and aleatory uncertainties. The TBM model was then incorporated into implicit, explicit, and discounting methods for handling failure dependencies in reliability evaluations. Finally, the model was applied to take into account CCFs in evaluating the reliability of a system composed of a computer with dual-operated subsystems for the self-diagnosis of failures. Future research tasks include the application of the TBM reliability model in FT analysis. Other failure dependency models (beta factor, load-sharing, etc.) will also be included in future work.
